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INTRODUCTION
 
The Space Station Safety Study was, as the name implies, a study of the safety

problems of future space stations, with the en inasis being on crew safety only,

rather than the broader system safety concept. Other factors which will influence
 
Titure station design and development, such as cost, weight, operational suit­
ability, and the like, were not specifically considered. Further, only the on­
orbit phase of the mission was examined and therefore, anything having to do with
 
launch, boost, orbit injection, de-orbit, re-en try3 and recovery has not-been con­
sidered as such. Management decisions will be lequired in which the desirability
 
or necessity of safety features must be weighei against the demands imposed by
 
other factors.
 
With the intent of making the study as complete as possible, all hazards and un­
desired events which could be identified were samined, and measures to cope with
 
them were devised. As a result, some of the sa,'ety measures described will seem
 
trite or self-evident, or describe actions already being taken. Also, no attempt
 
was made in general to determine the probability of occurrence of a hazard, or
 
establish reliability numbers. In short, the 1,gree of risk associated with the
 
various hazards was not determined and therefor., some safety measures may be
 
directed against hazards which have a very low )robability of occurrence.
 
The analytical techniques employed during the s-udy were discussed during the mid­
term review and are described in detail in the arious report documents and will be
 
mentioned only briefly in the review. Medical roblems of the station and base
 
are, for the most part, not discussed explicit,,: but are, instead, included in the..
 
study results.
 
The major portion of this presentatibn will be ,evoted to study results, but before
 
going to that, a short discussion of the study '.ackground is in order. 
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STUDY MILESTONES
 
The major milestones of the study are showr 3n this chart and it is, for the most
 
part, self-explanatory. However, a few words concerning the study phases are in
 
order.
 
In the month or so just before study initiation and during the first months of the
 
study, the thinking on future space statiors underwent a considerable revision,
 
culminating in the concepts now being studia i by two other contractors. The Safety
 
Study, as it was then contemplated, was not )riented to support the new concepts
 
as well as was desired. During the latter zxrt of April and, early May, the study
 
was redirected to better support the future 3pace station concepts. By way of
 
identification, the period prior to redirect Lon was called Phase I and subsequent,
 
Phase II.
 
Two major changes in the study resulted frcr the redirection. First, orientation
 
was shifted from consideration of specific iirdware as exemplified in the three
 
baseline configurations used, to consideratL)n of future concepts. This broadened
 
the study but restricted its detail. Seconi, the study product was changed from
 
Handbooks of Safety Design Guidelines and A:ronaut Safety Operating Procedures
 
to a tool by which management could evaluats "crew safety" in future space station
 
concepts and designs.
 
Every effort was made during Phase II to utL.ize the work done in Phase I and no
 
distinction is made, in general, between th two phases in this review.
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STUDY MLKSTONES
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STUDY OBJECTIVES
 
More formal statements of the scope and obj)ctives of the study are contained in
 
charts in the back of this brochure. Reduc'; to its essentials, we were asked
 
these two questions. First, we were requir,J to identify, to the maximum extent
 
possible, the actions necessary in order to maximize crew safety in the space
 
station or base. Second, we were asked to provide a "tool" or device by which
 
management could focus its attention on saf,ry and assure that the appropriate
 
safety actions were taken, or, if not taken, had been considered and rejected for
 
known and adequate reasons.
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STUDYT (UEJCTYES
 
(0 WHAT THINGS TO DO TO MAKE THE STATION/BASE SAFE 
Q WHAT MANAGEMENT DEVICE TO ASSURE THINGS ARE DONE 
I 
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STUDY CON';RAINTS
 
The study was subject to certain constraint3, as listed here. The orientation of
 
the study to safety only, and more specifi~illy to crew safety, has been mentioned
 
before and is re-emphasized here. The broaler system safety concept, in which
 
equipment performance and mission accomplisiment are of interest, was not consid­
ered. However, it should be noted that mar actions needed for crew safety also
 
enhance mission accomplishment.
 
Only the on-orbit phase of the mission was onsidered. Launch) boost, orbit in­
jection) de-orbit, re-entry and recovery %??e not examined as such and the study
 
results are not directed at these phases. Et should be noted, though, that these
 
phases have much in common with on-orbit ooerations and many safety measures
 
needed for the orbital phase are also appropriate for other phases.
 
The study dealt with concepts, rather than iardware, and no laboratory or test work
 
seemed to be appropriate.
 
No reliability or probability numbers were established for or derived during the
 
study. While we were free to establish ox ise such numbers if it seemed appropri­
ate, this constraint seemed desirable in the interest of assuring that we had
 
identified and examined as complete a list of hazards as possible, including those
 
which may prove, in the final analysis, to )e rather insignificant.
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STUDY COISTRAINTS 
0 CREW SAFETY 
® ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS 
® NO LABORATO":f! OR TEST WORK 
( NO RELIABILITY OR PROBABILITY NUMBERS 
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STUDY APPI ACE 
The basic approach taken in the study, and that which underlies all of the effort)
 
was to confine our attention to crew safety cnly, to the exclusion of other
 
factors, but within that framework to examine all identifiable hazards and develop
 
some course of action to alleviate each hazard.
 
The approach taken in specific study tasks was generally as shown on the chart.
 
Tne available body of experience was called m.)on in the form of documents, reports
 
and the like) including various space station configurations, and a representative
 
experiment program. A review and evaluation .*fthis information established a
 
baseline from which to proceed, presuming tha future space stations would be
 
analogous in some respects to past programs. The study techniques listed were used
 
to provide a methodical means of applying pa,, experience to future concepts to
 
established hazards likely to be encountered. This included hazards already known
 
and new or chang4JIzards which could be ex'4,,¢ted in the future concepts.
 
A safeguard aga2L I', ach hazard was develope(. ',od expressed as a Crew Safety Guide­
line.
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o 	REFERENCE MATERIAL 
o CONFIGURATION CONCEPTS
 
AND LAYOUTS
 
_STUDYo 	PAST EXPERIENCE TECHNIQUES 
® 	REPRESENTATIVE 'az%., o LOGIC DIAGRAM 
o 	FAULT TREEEXPERIMENT 

a 	SUBSYSTEMS ANALYSIS.. 	 o:_-_.....PROGRAM 

o 	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT o SUPPORTING ANALYSES 
AND CREW INTERFACE 
HAZARDS
 
IDENTIFICATION 
CREW
 
SAFETY 
GUIDE-

LINES 	 DL:';IRABLE SAFEGUARDS 
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STUDY PRODUCTS 
The primary product of the study was the Crew Safety Guidelines, which have just 
been mentioned, and secondary products ineluded the report documentation and tech­
niques which have been used in the study c'identifiedby it as appropriate for 
further use. 
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STUDYl? PROD
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PRIMARY PEC'DUCT 
The primary study product is the set of 282 0_,ew Safety Guidelines which are con­
tained in Document D2-113070-5. Over 500 guielines were derived initially, being
 
reduced to 282 during the study and particularly during the final review. Most of
 
the guidelines deleted were, in fact, combira-1 with other nearly identical or very
 
similar guidelines. In a few cases guidelines were deleted because they were not 
feasible or did not alleviate the hazard.
 
Each guideline appears in the document only ol.ce, listed under an appropriate 
hazard group. %!.yare, in addition, cross-....erenced to other hazard groups, to 
the subsystems ed by the guideline, by h:ey words, and by those applicable to 
damage containment and control.
 
,
The guidelines are a list of the actions whiz>. should be taken in the interest of
 
crew safety and t'tether they provide the tool by which management can evaluate
 
future concepts 4$r,j the safety viewpoint.
 
The guidelines w,.. be discussed -in more detC4, shortly. 
4&Fo',Z~: . 
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PRMJArly PRODUCT 
0 280+ GUIDELINES 
D2-113070-5 e CROSS-REFERENCED BY: 
CREW 
SAFETY HAZARD GROUP 
GUIDELINES AFFECTED SUBSYSTEMS 
KEY WORDS 
DAMAGE CONTROL 
LIST OF THINGS TO BE DONE 
PROVIDES BASIC MANAGEMENT DEVICE OR CHECKLIST 
FOR EVALUATION OF SPACE STATION SAFETY 
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HAZARD GROUPS 
The hazard groups used are shown in this chart together with the number of guide­
lines in each group.. These groups were identified originally by the logic diagram
 
as being representative of hazard groupings orclassifications identified or used
 
by previous investigators. Like all hazard gboupings examined, there is a con­
siderable amount of overlap between groups in this list and assignment of guide­
lines to a hazard group was frequently arbitrary. A brief description of each
 
group follows:
 
1.0 	 Contamination--the undesired presence of a material, either toxic or non­
toxic.
 
2.0 	 Debris and Meteoroid Impact--dollision or impact with natural or man-made
 
objects which are not part of or associated with the station.
 
3.0 	 Decompression/Overpressure--Deviatifon of station pressure from estab­
lished limits. 1
 
4.0 	 Electrical--any hazard associated with electricity,,including static
 
electricity.
 
5.0 	 Equipment Impact--collision or impact with equipment, subsatellites, or
 
other vehicles within or outside the station and which are associated
 
with the station.
 
6.0 	 Explosion--sudden disruption of station or components.
 
7.0 	 Illness and Injury--a condition in which the health of a crew member
 
departs from normal.
 
8.0 	 Loss of Vital Supplies--loss of food, air or water.
 
9.0 	 Radiation--all electromagnetic radiation, cosmic rays and by-products
 
of nuclear reactions.
 
10.0 	Temperature Extremes--either extreme heat or cold but also includes
 
variations of temperature from normal.
 
ll.0 	 Spacecraft Accelerations--any mot.on of the space station, whether
 
planned or unplanned.
 
12.0 	General--not particularly'applicable to any group, or applies to many or
 
all groups.
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HAkZAIl-ID GROUPS 
NO. OF NO. OF 
NO. TITLE GUIDELINES NO. TITLE GUIDELINES 
1.0 CONTAMINATION 32 7.0 ILLNESS AND INJURY 23 
2.0 DEBRIS AND METEROID :4 8.0 LOSSOFVITALSU'PPLIES 33 
IMPACT 
3.0 DECOMPRES SION/OVERPRESS URE 25 9.0 RADIATION 21 
4.0 ELECTRICAL ).4 10.0 TEMPERATURE EXTREME$ 30 
5.0 EQUIPMENT IMPACT 12 11.0 SPACECRAFT ACCELERATIONS 12 
6.0 EXPLOSION .3 12.0 GENERAL 63 
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SECONDARY PRODUCTS 
The secondary products include the other report dpcuments, which describe the tech­
niques used in the study and provide the reasonLng and rationale on which study
 
Also included are analytical techniques that are not described
conclusions were based. 

in the report documentation but which were identified during the study as possible
 
CASP was use6 to a limited extent in the Traffic
useful techniques for future work. 

Pattern analysis of the study but is capable of much broader application. It consists
 
of a computer program with which the total space mission can be examined including
 
crew skills, po,4er requirements, Sun angles, targets,
consideration of factors such as 

and the like. MARCEP is also a computer program by means of which an optimum main-

The Incipi­tainability and reliability program for a space station may be developed. 

y which acoustical energy is used to
 ent Failure Detection analysis provides a means 

detect failures of parts and components in their initial stages of the failure.
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SECOMDA~il PODUCTS 
D2-113070-4 D2-1 13070-6 D2-113070-9
 
CONDENSED SUPPORTING LOGIC 
SUMMARY ANALYSES DIAGRAM 
REPORT 
@REPORT DOCUMENTATION .. . _ 
D2-113070-10 D2-113070-11
 
FAULT SUBSYSTEMS 
TREES ANALYSIS 
o ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
e CREW ACTIVITY SEQUENCING PROGRAM (CASP)
 
( MAINTAINABILITY AND RELIABILITY COST EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM (MARCEP)
 
e INCIPIENT FAILURE DETECTION ANALYSIS
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GUIDELINES APPLICATION
 
Since the guidelines are the primary 15oduct, the remainder of the briefing will be
 
devoted to a discussion of what they are, whjt limitations or cautions are necessary
 
for their application, and their implications.. The guidelines are intended to be
 
specific enough to be useful and at the same tnme broad enough to be generally appli­
a

cable to any future space station. In one application they could be used simply as 

check list with which to review and evaluate scfety features of a final design. At
 
the other extreme from this would be to apply 1hem systematically to the developmeit
 
of station and base concepts that incorporate Lhe desired-safety features. In either
 
case, however, it is necessary that management establish a strong safety organization
 
having responsibility for planning and controlling the space station/base safety pro­
gram. In that regard, the guidelines provide basis for establishing a viable safety
 
program.
 
During the final stages of the study we conducted a feasibility review to assure
 
Further discussion
ourselves that the'guidelines were feasible and could be applied. 

will show that, at least for those guidelines discussed, they are feasible.
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WHAT IS A GUIDELINE?
 
No suitable existing definition was found for the term "guideline." This 
definition
 
term in the sense in which as the best expression to be found of the was synthesized 
are intended,
the guidelines derived during the study 

In the case of crew safety guidelines, of course, it is understood 
that the course of
 
action, if taken, will to some degree enhance crew safety in the 
space station or
 
are equtlly applicable to either the station or the
 base. Furthermore, all guidelines 

sense of the guideline clearly limits its application.
base unless the 

.- J
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IT IS A STATEMENT THAT POINTS THE WAY 
TOWARD A CURSE OF ACTION 
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GROUND RULE 
attempted to work first with the zero-gravity station and
Early'in the study, we 

then translate the results to the artificiali-gravity space base. Because of signi­
this ipproach appeared less effective than
ficant differences in the two concepts, 

the reverse, namely, to deal first with the base and translate the results to the
 
station. In the latter part of the study, especially during Phase II, the ground
 
rule as shown, then, applied.
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@STATEMENTS MADE ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE 
TO SPACE STAT !ON AND SPACE BASE 
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COORDINATE SYSTEM
 
The coordinate system shown was arbitrarily established. In this system the Z'-axis
 
is the axis of rotation, the X-axis is the radias of rotation and the Y-axis is tan­
gent to the rotation. Rotation is in the -Y direction. In the station and the ro­
tating portion of the base, the usual X, Y, and Z axes are used.
 
j567.eAF/4t 
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ClooRD1!iAT~e SYSTEM 
+X
 
CENTER OF ROTATION 
+Z'
 
DIRECTION OF
-Z ROTATION
 
SPACE STATION! BASE 
+Y
 
-x 
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CONFIGURAT[')N DRIVERS
 
i
 
Guidelines'may serve to direct design 'detatis, establish procedures, or may tend to
 
drive the configuration. Because most guidolines have elements of all three, they
 
are not cross-referenced or grouped that way.
 
Since configuration drivers are most import-nt, at least in the early stages of design
 
and development, most of this discussion wL!l deal with guidelines that are strongly
 
configuration drivers.
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TRAFFIC/WORK FLOW GIiDELINES 
Presumably, almost any guideline, or set of gusdelines, which tend to establish the
 
configuration could be chosen as a starting po..nt. 
 Those dealing with traffic and
 
work flow were chosen because they appear tb rnpresent problems in future space sta­
tions, which will be considerably greater than uimilar problems of the past, particu­
larly with respect to the artificial gravity. sp'tce base.
 
Three typical guidelines in this area, the gist of which is shown on the chart, are:
 
7.7 	 Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that the direction of major
 
traffic flow is parallel to the vehiclk spin axis.
 
7.19 	 Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that radial traffic is kept to
 
a minimum.
 
7.23 	 Crew living and working stations should be oriented such that during normal
 
activity, the lateral axis through the crew members' ears 
is parallel to the
 
axis of spin. In conjunction with this guideline, the work console instru­
ments and controls should be designed so that left-right head rotations and
 
up-down arm motions are minimized.
 
Considering these guidelines, and only these guidelines, a concept for the station/
 
base can be developed.
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TRAFFfIC/WR FLOWN GUIDUWES 
7.7 MAJOR TRA;:IC FLOW PARALLEL TO AXIS OF ROTATION 
7.19 RADIAL TRAFFIC KEPT AT MINIMUM 
7.23 AXIS THROUGH EARS PARALLEL TO AXIS OF ROTATION 
3.
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TRAFFIC/WORK CONFIGURATION
 
Such a concept is shown here, in which only the artificial gravity portion of the
 
space base is shown. Other components would include a non-rotating hub along the Z'
 
axis and counterbalances (e.g., nuclear electric power supplies) in the +X direction.
 
The base is long and slender, fording the major flow of traffic in the axial direc­
tion, as specified. It has only one deck, thereby eliminating radial traffic except
 
for traffic to the non-rotating, zero-gravity central hub, and such traffic apparently
 
is unavoidable in any rotating configuration. The location and arrangement of the
 
crew work.station, as shown in the cut-away and the enlarged detail, complies with
 
the guideline.
 
This concept is presented4 not as a candidate configuration, but to illustrate two
 
poiiits with respect to the guidelines. First, iE other factors such as launch and
 
boost problems and rotation dynamics were considered, this particular concept might
 
encounter some difficulties. Therefore a consideration of other factors, involving
 
trade studies comparing safety features versus other important matters, is necessary
 
with respect to most guidelines. Second, from the safety point of view alone, this
 
concept does not include certain features which are also desireable. This points to
 
a second set of trade studies to evaluate the relative merits of desired safety fea­
tures and effect the best compromise possible.
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TAmC/Wor'r COmmuImGUAi!ON 
-Zr +X 
-Z
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COMPARTMENTATION GUIDELINES
 
To illustrate the comptomise necessary with raspect to safety features, consider the
 
requirements for compartmentation and associd features. Two typical guidelines in
 
this area are:
 
12.13 	 The space station/base areas inhabital by the crew should consist of two or
 
more independently pressurizable compartments with more than one exit from
 
each compartment.
 
12.30 	 Each compartment should have a minimzi of two escape routes,'which should not
 
terminate in a common compartment.
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12.13 TWO OR MORE COMPARTMENTS 
12.30 TWO OR MORE EXITS NOT TERMINATING AT COMMON POINT 
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COMPARTMENT-4
-INIMUM
 
This bubble diagram illustrates the ideas e)pressed in.the guidelines just quoted.
 
It indicates that the minimum number of comlertments will be three, each of which
 
has two ways of exit.
 
No conclusions should be drawn here as to the relative size of the compartments,
 
nor as to their placement with respect to ea !..
other and the routes between them.
 
3o,
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COMPARTENTATION
 
A compromise between the traffic pattern concert and the compartmentation concept
 
can be reached as shown here, in which three, single-deck compartments are stacked
 
as shown. In the artificial-gravity base, th2,s arrangement would rotate in the.Y
 
direction about a central non-rotating hub displaced along the X-axis. This con­
cept meets the compartmentation requirement, but does so at the expense of requir­
ing some radial traffic in order to travel between decks.
 
This, again, is not a candidate configuration. Neither should any conclusions be
 
drawn from this as to the relative importance & compartmentation versus traffic[
 
flow.
 
While no attempt has been made to establish prcportions or dimensions in these con­
cepts, -it was noted that three, 14-foot diameter compartments could be accommodated
 
within a 33-foot diameter envelope.
 
As before) consideration of other factors might reveal shortcomings in this con­
cept, but more important from our point of view, certain safety features are still
 
lacking.
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CREW DISTRIBUTION GU:DELINE
 
members to a hazard or
 
In the interest of exposing the fewest possible crew 
,he station, the following guide­
emergency'which occurs at a particular point in 

line states:
 
The number of crew members in any ccnoartment at one 
time should be
 
12.18 

held to the minimum necessary to perflrm the required functions.
 
fhen some other findings of the
 
Compliance with this guideline may be difficult 

study are considered,
 
An ~nt
.~A9J4 
2-113070-3
 
CRIW ISTIIMHION GLI1W11
 
12.18 MINIMUM NUMBER INANY COMPARTMENT 
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CREW DISTRIBUTION
 
A finding of the study was that crew membets spend about two-thirds of their time
 
in those areas devoted to crev health and well-.being. This chart shows man-hours
 
per day spent in eating, sleeping, personal hygiene, recreation and exercise. In
 
the 12-man space station illustrated, the crei tends to congregate in these areas
 
on Decks 4 and 5. The other three decks of the station do not have any-areas
 
having more than 10 man-hours per day occupancy.
 
A similar finding was made with the other configurations examined and we find no
 
reason to think that any other configuration will be greatly different. Possibly
 
crew activity scheduling might alleviate the situation to some degree but probably
 
not entirely.'
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cgvIi IISTUIITION 
12-MAN SPACE STATION 
TOTAL MANHOURS PER DAY 
0- 10 10- 30 0- 70 
PERSNAL: PERSO N AL 
HYGYGIEN 
QUARTER 'CURE 
WARTRR QUARTER 
CREW QUARTERS, GALLEY, COMMAND AND CONTROL CREW QUARTERS AND WARD ROOM 
DECK 4 DECK 5 
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CREW AREA LOCAMON GUIDELINE
 
Recognizing, then, that the "minimum" nufibci 
of crew members in a compartment may
 
prove to be a relatively large number, the fllowing guideline was derived:
 
12.20 	The areas in which crew members soend the majority of their time, e-g.,
 
staterooms, dining facilities, pe-sonal hygiene, exercise, and recrea­
tion areas, should be located and designed to be the safest parts of
 
the station.
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CREW AREA IOCATUON GUDMflE 
12.20 CREW-ORIENTED AREAS TO BE MAXIMUM SAFETY 
T4E 5COMPANY 
45 
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CREW AREA LOCATION 
A reasonable solution is shown in this concept ia which the crew-oriented area is 
located centrally within the station. Walls ana bulkheads surrounding the crew 
area are pressure structures, as are the exterior walls and bulkheads of the 
station. The area surrounding the crew area would be equipment and storage bays. 
Other features, such as conducting particularly hazardous operations at a location
 
as remote as possible from the crew area, would also be required.
 
This concept appears to afford maximum protecticn to the crew from all hazards,
 
except possibly high radiation levels.
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CREW AREA LOCATION
 
I7 II
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REDUNDANCY GUIDEMENES 
There is a considerable number of guidelines whioh express the idea of redundancy
 
in one way or another. Only one will be quoted in entirety, which is:
 
8.9 A space station should include at least two independent EC/LSS's located
 
in separate compartments. These systTms should be capable of supplying
 
the atmospheric requirements even with one system inoperative.
 
The other guidelines express the same ideas, namely, duplicate systems, either of
 
which operating alone can supply the total station requirements, at least those
 
requirements essential to crew safety.
 
In sum total, these guidelines require a configtdration which begins to approach
 
two interconnected and mutually supporting stations.
 
flot 
D:2-.113070-3 
REDUNDAV~lcyGUDIJE 
1.4 CONTAMINANT DETECTION EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE REDUNDANT 
1.12 FOOD STORED INMORE THAN ONE CONTAINER 
.1.14 FOOD REFRIGERATION SHOULD BE REDUNDANT 
5.5 MORE THAN ONE DOCKING PORT 
8.14 MORE THAN ONE OXYGEN STORAGE TANK 
8.33 MORE THAN ONE WATER STORAGE TANK 
10.26 THERMAL CONTROL EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE REDUNDANT 
12.23 REDUNDANT DOCKING MECHANISMS. 
4.9 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REDUNDANT 
4.11 MORE THAN ONE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY 
8.9 AT LEAST TWO INO)EPENDENT ECILSS'S 
49
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STATION/BASE CUOCEPT 
The concept shown here incorporates all the safaty features, or necessary compromises,
 
that have been discussed previously. It is ess'ntially a Siamese twin, divided into
 
two halves by a central pressure bulkhead through which hatches allow access between
 
the halves. The crew area is double-decked, located centrally with pressure bulkheads
 
at the ends and witt the shell surrounding the area a pressure wall. &xtarior walls
 
and bulkheads are pressure structures. Note Itat this arrangement of pressure walls
 
and bulkheads provides six separately pressur: able compartments. Work and laboratory
 
areas at the ends are shown triple-decked but ould, of course, have oLher arrangements.
 
In the rotating space base configuration, an e..evator shaft for each half allows
 
access to the central non-rotating hub and, farther, to two nuclear electric power 
sources which also are counterweights. Majo: ;:raffic flow is axial with radial and 
tangential traffic minimized. Also, the elevE:or would provide the normal means' of 
radial movement. 
02 -113070-3 
STATI.41l I/BASEONCEPT -
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AIRLOCKS AND PASSAGEWAYS GUIDELINES
 
With the general concept in mind, we can now proceed to see how other guidelines
 
will affect or be affected by it. There are a number of guidelines which have to do
 
with airlo&ks and passageways. The gist of several are shown in the chart, of which
 
only 
two are quoted in entirety:
 
3.9 	 Provision should be made for an airlock in the hatch or hatchway between
 
separately pressurizable compartments.
 
12.1 	 Accessways between and within compartments should be sized in such a manner
 
that an IVA-suited crew member will be allowed access to normally used areas.
 
These, 	together with others of 
a like 	nature, can strongly affect the configuration.
 
D2-113070-3
 
AIIRLOCKS AND PAISAGEWAYS GUIDWNFES
 
3.9 AIRLOCK IN HATCH BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS 
12.1 ACCESSWAYS LARGE ENOUGH FOR SUITED CREWMAN 
12.4 MORE THAN ONE EXTERNAL AIRLOCK 
12.30 AT LEAST TWO EXITS FROM COMPARTMENTS 
12.62 TRAFFIC, ROUTES SO AS TO MINIMIZE CONGESTION 
53
 
D2-113070-.
 
AIRLOCKS AND PASSAGEWAYS
 
As shown here, strict application of these guidelines will call for fairly good sized
 
hatches, which may be unavoidable, and numeroue; airlocks. This illustrates again
 
the point made earlier, that a valid guideline nay require, in the practical applica­
tion, some compromises.
 
The idea of airlocks between compartments, of course, is to allow access to a de­
pressurized compartment without having to depressurize the entire station. If the
 
number of compartments is small, the requiremet for airlocks between them becomes
 
much more urgent. On the other hand, if there are many compartments, it would be
 
possible, and might be more desirable, to gain access by depressurizing an adjacent
 
compartment. An alternate which might also be considered would be use of a portable
 
airlock.
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DESIGN DETAILS
 
The guidelines discussed so far have been primarily configuration drivers. Many
 
guidelines are concerned with design details, insofar as we were able to cover them
 
in the study, and some of these will be discurssed.
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DS IG DETAILS
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COMMAND, CONTROL, AND 1!ARNING GUIDELINES
 
A set df guidelines has to do with command ai,6 control'and the provision of detec­
tion devices and warning systems. The gist of some of them is given in this chart.
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COMMAND, CONTROL., AIID WAWNIWGIWDEHNIS 
1.24 VISUAL/AUDIBLE CONTAMINATION WARNING 
3.24 CABIN PRESSUIT[:. WARNING SYSTEM 1 
3.25 WARNING SYSTEMS FAIL SAFE AND INDICATE FAILURE 
8.30 VISUAL/AUD IBLWARNING OF OFF-LIM.ITS OXYGEN PRESSURE 
12.5 PROVIDE AN AL-RNATE COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER 
12.8 C&C CENTER TO AUTHORIZE HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 
12.10 MONITOR HAZARDOUS OPERATION BY REMOTE TV 
12.22 CRITICAL WARNING ALARMS IN ALL COMPARTMENTS 
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COMMAND, CONTROL, AND WARNING SYSTEM
 
Here we show'two command and control centers. They are located in separate compart­
ments and ate physically well separated from each other. A warning or alarm system
 
is shown in each compartment.
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COMMANlW, CONiR)L, AND WARNING SYSTEI 
ALTERNATE 
C&CCc 
/ PRIMARY 
C&CC 
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TETHERS AND RESTRAINTS (UIDELINES
 
A positive means of controlling the motion of cargo at all times will be required and
 
this is especially true in the artificial gravity base. These guidelines express this
 
idea:
 
5.1 	 All bulk cargo should be properly tethereC or otherwise controlled during zero­
gravity or reduced-gravity operations.
 
5.10 	 Adequate restraints, tethers or aids to assist the crew in personal movements 
and handling large-mass equipment should ±e available throughout the interior 
and exterior of the space station. 
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TKTHIERS AND b!MI LAMS GW1RUWLES 
CARGO SHOUL BE TETHERED OR CONTROLLED 
5.10 	 RESTRAINTS T(, ASSIST INMOVING LARGE-MASS 
EQUI PMENT SHOULD BE PROVIDED 
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RESTRAINTS CONCEPTS
 
This chart shows cargo being moved by elevator bet:ween the non-rotating hub and the
 
artificial gravity portion of the space base.
 
The cargo is tied down to a pallet or dolly which is equipped with several sets of
 
dual wheels or castors. The wheels operate in slotted tracks in the elevator plat­
form with similar slotted tracks in all decks of the base. The wheels are provided
 
with a braking system, for example, expanding the wheels against the sides of the
 
slots. This concept restrains the cargo from all motion, including translation and
 
rotation, except as desired along the tracks. It will operate under all gravity
 
conditions including the transition from zero gravity to artificial gravity.
 
The elevator itself is driven by a reversible mozor operating a cog wheel or wheels
 
which engage tracks in the elevator shaft walls. In addition to moving cargo, the
 
elevator would also be the primary means of crew movement. For simplicity, this
 
sketch does not show the grills, guards or other protector devices which would be
 
required.
 
This concept, as stated, can be used under all gravity conditions but the question
 
arises as to how to transfer across thp interface between the rotating and non-rotating
 
portions of the station.
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REST"WATS CONCEPTS
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CARGO TRANSFER 
This chart shows a concept for accomplishing transfer of cargo, and also personnel
 
across the rotating/non-rotating interface. A transfer cage is located across the
 
interface, the cage being free to rotate but restrained from other motion by tra­
vellers following slots in the bulkheads. A tranifer platform, having slotted tracks,
 
is mounted in the cage. A set of clutches permits the cage to be coupled with, and
 
match the motion of, either the rotating or non-rotating sections.
 
Assume that cargo is to be transferred from the non-rotating hub to the artificial
 
gravity section. The cargo, on the dolly previously illustrated is initially on the
 
non-rotating deck. The appropriate clutch is engaged to match cage motion to that
 
of the non-rotating section and with the transfer platform aligned with the station
 
deck. The cargo dolly is then wheeled from the deck to the transfer platform. By
 
disengaging the one clutch and engaging the other, cage motion is matched to that 
of the rotating portion with the,transfer platforms aligned with the elevator plat­
form. The cargo dolly is wheeled onto the elevator platform and transported by
 
elevator to its destination deck'
 
For simpiicity, safety guards and,grills and othcr features are not shown.
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CAR(31O TRAN1SFLER
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SHUT-OFFS AND CONNECTORS GUIDELINES
 
Fluid lines may be damaged and require repliycement or, in any case, may require
 
disconnect and connect from time to time. Certain guidelines are directed toward
 
prevention of contamination from the fluids in the lines. They include:
 
1.21 	 Connectors used to connect plumbing (r components in fluid systems should
 
be designed for minimum loss of fluic. when disconnected.
 
1.22 	 The number of connectors used in pliibing and connections of fluid systems
 
should be kept to a minimum.
 
'D2-1 13070-3 
SIMMOFS AND tCO.NNECTORS GUMDWN2S 
1.10 BE ABLE TO SHUT OFF FLUID FLOW TO DAMAGED SECTIONS 
1.21 MINIMUM FLUID LOSS WHEN DISCONNECTING 
1.22 KEEP NUMBER OF CONNECTORS TO MINIMUM 
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VALUES AND CONNECTORS
 
This sketch illustrates the ideas expressed in the guidelines, namely, a means of
 
shut-off of the fluid flow, minimizing the number of connectors as shown by the two
 
which are crossed out, and providing a means of collecting escaping fluid when a
 
disconnect is required. Under zero gravity, of course, a more sophisticated device
 
than that shown will be required
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VAIESAND CONNECTORS
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PROCEDURAL 
We have discussed guidelines which are primar< ly configuration drivers and some which
 
dictate design details. A few guidelines whi.ch are directed'more toward procedures
 
will now be discussed.
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HAZARDOUS MATERIAl S GUIDELINES 
The operational and experimental requirementt. of the space station and base will
 
dictate that certain hazardous materials wilt be on board. In addition, it is
 
possible for some materials which are not in rhemselves particularly hazardous to
 
interact with other materials and/or the spaz craft subsystems so as to form new,
 
and hazardous materials.
 
The guidelines summarized in the chart are t.' ical of those intended to reduce the 
probability of contamination. 
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HAZARDOUS iALTERII WH1ES
 
1.15 QUANTITY OF HAZARCOUS MATERIAL SHOULD BE LIMITED 
1.18 THERE SHOULD BE CONlFIGURATION CONTROL OVER ALL MATERIALS 
St•, II.. tlRE T T 
7.1,'-"" ACCESS TO HAZARD(. SMATERIALS RESTRICTED 
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HAZARDOUS MAraRIALS
 
This cartoon illustrates the points made in the guidelines.
 
Materials configuration control, as contemplatced here, is quite comprehensive. It
 
covers not only those materials brought on boaLrd the spacecraft for operational or 
experimental purposes but also materials, including solvents and cleaners, used
 
during manufacture and personal possessions of the crew. The intent is first, to
 
bar any material which is not required and, sucond, to maintain a record of mater­
ials as a starting point in the event that unexpected contamination occurs.
 
While access to hazardous materials may often be restricted by procedures, there
 
will undoubtedly be some materials, such as poisons, drugs, highly toxic substances,
 
and the like, for which locked storage will b.. necessary.
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HAZARDOUS MUMATIS
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VENTING AND WASTE GUIDELINES
 
During final review and evaluation of the gui:e lines it was noticed 
that a number of
 
them dealt with the general.subject of the genf.ration and disposal of waste material.
 
This included venting or dumping of materials cverboard.
 
None of these guidelines will be quoted here in entirety but 
the gist of some of them
 
on the space base is shown in the next,
 is shown in the chart. The possible impact 

chart.
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YENTHNG Ai, D WARTE GUO S 
1.28 
3.21 
8.31 
9,2 
11. 11 
CONTROL (VENTING) OF EFFLUENTS FROM WASTE 
CABIN PRESSURE VENTS SEPARATE FROM OTHER FLUIDS 
PROCEDURES NEEDED FOR DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED WATER 
MEANS FOR DISPOSING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
COMBUSTI BLE WAS"'E STORED WITHOUT FI RE HAZARD 
NO TORQUES FROM VENT OUTLETS 
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WASTE DISPOSAL
 
This cartoon, of course, is somewhat exagger.ied, but it does illustrate the pro­
blem, namely, that the vicinity of the space,: aft could become contaminated with
 
crew safety cces not appear to be great, although
waste materials. The impact on 

came along too late in the study for de:.;iled analysis, and there is no guide­this 

line which specifically restricts dumping or venting overboard.
 
During Phase I some preliminary work was don! with respect to performance of the
 
During this work there were indica: ons that some portions of the experi­mission. 

mental program could be seriously impaired by effluents or debris in the vicinity of
 
While this work did not progre33 to the point where definite conclusions
the station. 

appear that venting .r'disposal of material overboard
could be drawn, it does 

should be held to the minimum possible.
 
This raises the question of how to dispose o& waste.
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WASTE DISPOSAL ALTERNATIVES
 
Shown here are three possible alternatives for the disposal of waste.
 
In the first alternative, the waste, in a su:Atable container, is placed in a
 
solar orbit or solar impact trajectory. The energy requirements for this method,
 
of course, are quite high and it probably wou2d not be acceptable except possibly 
for highly hazardous items such as radioactite waste, It follows, then, that
 
whatever goes up must come back down and two ueans of coming back down are shown.
 
In one way the waste, ±n a suitable containe2: is allowed to reenter the earthts
 
atmosphere and either burn up during reentry tr impact in a suitable disposal area,
 
such as an ocean. In the other way, the spac shuttle is used to return the waste
 
for disposal, in such manner as may be accep-.ble, after landing. The implications
 
on the space shuttle are self-evident.
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WASTE -DH~L~OSA ALTERNATIIES
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DAMAGE CONTAINMENT ANI? CONTROL
 
Damage containment and control was not specifically set forth as a task in Phase II
 
but was to be covered to the extent possible as iacorollary to other efforts. The
 
subject was considered briefly in the analysis oX operations, and in addition, those
 
guidelines which are particularly applicable to damage containment and control were
 
identified and cross-referenced. The gist of those guidelines is summarized on
 
this chart.
 
The first step is identification of the damage which implies the existence of some
 
sort of a system of sensors or detectors to determine that damage has occurred and
 
to provide a warning or alarm to the crew. The ideas of inspecting the station and
 
monitoring hazardous operations are also included.
 
Having identified the damage, the next step is to isolate it to prevent its spread
 
into other portions of the station beyond the original site. The ideas included
 
here are such things as compartmentation of the station and providing hatches,
 
valves, and other types of closures; isolated stores of hazardous matdrial; safe
 
areas in which hazardous operations can be conducted; and suppression devices such
 
as crack stoppers in structures.
 
Finally, are the actions taken to remedy the dam.:e and return the station to nor­
mal conditions or at least to a safe condition. 'he ideas included here are that
 
access to danged areas be required; that commun:cations systems be available, that
 
a means for survival or rescue of crew members i) damaged areas be provided and, of
 
cuuvte, that means of remiedying or repairing the (amage be available.
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® IDENTIFICATION- 10 GUIDELINES 
0 DETECTION, WARNING, ALARM 
o INSPECTI(O) 
* MONITORING 
@ ISOLATION-.''9 GUIDELINES 
o COMPARTP-NTATION 
* HATCHES, VALVES, CLOSURE DEVICES 
o ISOLATED 'STORAGE 
o "SAFE" ARE"_AS 
a SUPPRESS ION DEVICES 
0 COUNTERACTrON- 14 GUIDELINES 
oACCESS
 
0 COMMUNIH.ATIONS 
o RESCUE/SURV IVAL 
o REMEDIES
 
THE COMPANY 
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SUMMARY'
 
The safety problems of the future space station and base have been thoroughly re­
viewed. We found no reason to think that an acceptable safety level cannot be
 
achieved within the current state of the art.
 
A set of Crew Safety Guidelines has been derived which constitutes a list of actions
 
which should be taken to enhance the safety of the station or base. They'are a
 
checklist, as well, by which management can rev;oew and evaluate future space stations
 
from the safety standpoint,
 
Application of the guidelines appears to be feasIble hut must be made subject to a
 
number of compromises. Within individual guidelines, the desirability of the safety
 
features obtained must be weighed against other factors such as cost. In addition,
 
safety features required by two or more differeit guidelines are sometimes indompa­
tible and one or all must be compromized to soma degree. The guidelines provide a,
 
basis, nevertheless, for a viable safety program.
 
Damage containment and control procedures and autions to be taken are spelled out in
 
some of the guidelines which have been identifie, by cross-references.
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* 	 SPACE STATION/BASE SAFETY PROBLEMS REVIEWED 
NO COMPELLING REASON THAT SAFETY LEVEL WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE 
* CREW SAFETY GUIDELIN ES DERIVED 
o SUGGESTED ACTIONS TO ENHANCE SAFETY 
o CHECKLIST OF SAFETY ITEMS
 
® BASIS FOR VIABLE E'AFETY PROGRAM
 
@GUIDELINE APPLICATI'N WILL REQUIRE COMPROMISES 
o WITHIN INDIVIDUMl GUIDELINES 
o AMONG TWO OR MO:- GUIDELINES 
0 	 DAMAGE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL 
INCLUDED INGUID[.fNES AND CROSS-REFERENCED 
HE 	 COM PA8NY 
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DESIRABLE FUTURE EFCRT
 
"Off-normal" gravity means a gravity environment dliferent from that of earth, either
 
zero gravity or artificial gravity produced by rotlion. For study purposes, two
 
assumptions were made, the first being that the crcr: 
 could perform assigned tasks in
 
the station/base environment and the second being that fires in the station/base
 
would continue to burn once they started. Further investigation in these areas is
 
needed, although it is recognized that such invest:-gation likely must be concurrent
 
with station/base operation.
 
Only preliminary work was done in the study with respect to nuclear-fueled elec­
trical power supply systems safety. It was apparert that adequate coverage of this
 
area would require far greater resources than were available in the study, probably
 
an effort approaching the magnitude of the safety study itself.
 
The Crew Activity Sequencing Program (CASP) is available as a computer program. It
 
could be readily modified to incorporate desired safety factors (which it does not
 
currently do), 
 a modified experiment program and the advanced station/base concepts.
 
It would then provide a means of reviewing future space programs, not only from the
 
safety viewpoint but from mission accomplishment as -ell. Similarly, the Logic Dia­
gram is amenable to development of a computer progrem based on it. The effect of 
changing assumption could be readily explored and toe most critical and sensitive
 
safety areas identifieo. j 
The safety study was cpJ. ined to on-orbit operatior:; ;f the space station or base. 
:However, many safety pC'1 7.tms of other space progr 2 such as the space shuttle,
 
lunar surface explorati'p and interplanetary missio si are identical, or very siailar
 
Eo, those of the space station and base. This study provides a starting point for 
safety studies of these g)ither programs. In any caoi such safety studies should be
 
con4ucted.
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DEM MEfl ELfl1R4 WFORT 
* HUMAN EFFECTS OF "OFF-NORMAL" GRAVITY 
* FIRE CHARACTERISTICS IN"OFT-NORMAL" GRAVITY
 
® NUCLEAR-FUELED ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SAFETY
 
® APPLICATION OF AVAILABLE TECHNIQUES TO FUTURE STATION/BASE SAFETY 
o CASP 
* LOGIC DIAGRAM
 
@ SAFETY STUDIES 'OF OTHER SPACE PROGRAMS
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PHASE I 
No distinction has been made in this review between Phase I and Phase II. The
 
scope, objective, product and station configurations used in Phase I are summarized
 
briefly here. A more detailed discussion can be found in Document D2-113070-2 "Mid­
term Oral Review."
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KIME I
 
o SCOPE 
@BROAD CLASSES OF SPACE STATIONS 
eCREW SAFETY-MISSION PERFORMANCE 
* 	OBJECTIVES 
OSAFETY GUID'.LIkNES AND CONCEPTS 
e SAFETY PROCEDURAL.AND DESIGN GUIDELINES 
e DAMAGE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL PROCEDURES 
S PRODUCT-MATERIAL FOR HANDBOOKS 
e SAFETY DESIGN GUIDELINES 
eASTRONAUT SAFETY OPERATING PROCEDURES 
e CONFIGURATIONS -SLSS, EOSS, JAG-1 
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PHASE II
 
Similarly, greater detail on Phase II scope, objective and product can b6 found in
 
D2-113070-2, "Midterm Oral Review" and in the final study report documents.
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* 	SCOPE 
e CREW SAFETY IN PHASE BFUTURE SPACE STATIONIBASE 
* OBJECTIVE
 
e MANAGEMENT TOOL TO GUIDE AND EVALUATE CONCEPTUAL 
DESIGNS OF SPACE STATIONS/SPACE BASES FROM A 
SAFETY VIEWPOINT 
o PRODUCT
 
o CREW SAFETY GUIDELINES,
 
DAPPROACH TO DAMAGE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL
 
PROCEDURES
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PHASE II CONFIGURATIONS
 
The station and base configurations used during Phase II of the study are shown here.
 
They were developed early in Phase IT and did not incorporate Any safety features
 
derived during the study.
 
They are to the same scale, the space station being in the artificial-gravity experi­
ment configuration. As can be seen, from this review incorporation of safety features
 
would change these concepts very radically.
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SPACE BASE
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FEETSPACE STATION 
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